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Abstract 
The purpose of the research examines the evolution of India‟s nuclear program as it developed from 
the 1940s by a small group of influential scientists and the current nuclear capabilities that they now 
posses. The Indian nuclear program continues to develop improved weapons technologies and 
economic development with the potential to proliferate nuclear material. India since 1947, in order to 
develop a comprehensive strategy that utilizes all the instruments of national power that will encourage 
India to become a responsible stakeholder among the nuclearized countries and demonstrate the 
responsibility that goes along with nuclear technology. India‟s nuclear policy was also influenced by 
India‟s international security condition as well as by domestic variables such as the vagaries of 
political change and the inﬂuence of bureaucratic elites. India aspired to be a nuclear state after 1962 
conflict with China, particularity after China conducted its first nuclear test in 1964 The role of „the 
nuclear‟ in global power status however is central to being recognized as a power to be reckoned with. 
Despite India‟s nuclear tests in 1974 and 1998, such recognition had always eluded India. Since India 
was not a signatory to the NPT.  
 
Introduction 
India is showing a new image of itself to the 
world and the world is recognizing that today, 
India is indeed a country to be imagined with. 
65 years on, Jawaharlal Nehru‟s dream of 
India being recognized as a global power has 
been closer. India always as pired global 
recognition; however, for almost half a 
century India was seen as overpopulated, poor 
and irrelevant. Although the hegemony in the 
South Asian region and a leader within the 
Non Aligned Movement this hardly mattered 
on the wider world stage. India‟s nuclear 
policy after independence was very flexible 
and reactive in nature. The global vision 
engendered by Nehru was based on moral 
supremacy and leadership of the developing 
world as well as economic self-sufficiency at 
home. These moral principles focused largely 
on issues of superpower domination, nuclear 
weapons and anti-imperialism and were 
passed on from government to government 
from independence. However as the world 
around India changed these principles slowly 
became obsolete.India aspired to be a nuclear 
state after 1962 conflict with China, 
particularity after China conducted its first  
nuclear test in 1964. India carried out its first 
 
Nuclear detonation a “peaceful nuclear 
explosion,” on May 18, 
1974. This test code named “Smiling Buddha” 
was conducted in the western parts of India 
over a dessert terrain at a small village called 
Pokhran. Since then this test has been mostly 
known as Pokhran-1 and it had demonstrated 
a yield of perhaps 12 Kilo Tons (kT) (Ajey 
Lele: 2013). On May 11, 1998, India tested 
three devices at the Pokhran underground 
testing site, followed by two more tests on 
May 13, 1998. These tests include fission 
device with a yield of about 12 kT, a 
thermonuclear device with a yield of about 43 
KT, and a sub-kiloton device. (Ajey Lele: 
2013)  
The realization that global power, nuclear 
power, security, energy policy and economic 
growth are linked has led to a new nuclear 
policy formulation. New Delhi‟s priority 
today is to protect India‟s security, economic 
growth and foreign policy has been harnessed 
to create linkages with those countries that 
could provide nuclear energy security. This is 
because India sees that the only way it can 
“KALAM” International Journal of Faculty of Arts and Culture, South Eastern University of Sri Lanka 
   
VOLUME VIII (2), DECEMBER 2014 ISSN: 1391-6815  P a g e  | 103 
maintain its‟ current position on the global 
scale is through its growth. 
India is a nuclear state because of the 
complicated security milieu in the sub-
continent. Understanding the dangers of 
nuclear weapons and the type of paranoia they 
could create both regionally and globally, 
India has by design adopted a policy to 
restraint which involves minimum deterrence 
and not first use as the two vital pillars of its 
nuclear policy. 
This paper aims to draw together the evolution 
of India‟s nuclear program economic growth 
and the quest for global power status. It will 
give a brief background to India‟s nuclear 
power program and analyze its developments.  
Origin and development of new nuclear 
policy 
In India, nuclear weapons and   energy 
development began with the objectives of 
attaining world power and improving the 
quality of life of the people and self-reliance 
in meeting their energy needs. Although the 
foundation of Indian nuclear programme was 
laid on the 12th of March 1944, (Naeem 
Ahamed Salik:n.d),  it was a tentative attempt. 
The origin of the atomic energy programme in 
India after independence, started with its 
nuclear programme headed and   can be traced 
unambiguously to a remarkably bold initiative 
taken by Homi Jehangir Bhabha under the 
Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1948 focusing 
on peaceful development (Ajey Lele:2013). 
He proposed setting up of a rigorous school of 
research in fundamental physics for this 
purpose. Bhabha prophesied that a completely 
self-reliant power programme would come 
about within two decades. On 10th August 
1948, the Government of India constituted the 
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), under the 
Atomic Energy Act to establish the atomic 
energy programme. One of the ﬁrst tasks of 
the Commission was to explore the 
availability of raw material resources within 
the country. As AEC was setup in 1948, in the 
Nearly years, India assumed a categorical 
Anti- nuclear weapon position. This phase did 
not last long. On 3rd August 1954, the 
Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) was 
established. Immediate effort was to develop 
key elements of infrastructure for a nuclear 
power programme. All scientists and 
engineers engaged in the ﬁelds of reactor 
design and development, instrumentation, 
metallurgy and material science, etc.   A 
strong pro-nuclear weapons lobby emerged in 
India in the 1960s. The rise of the lobby was 
due to two reasons. Firstly, the humiliating 
defeat of India in her border Sino-Indian war 
with China in 1962. Secondly, China‟s 
detonation of its first nuclear bomb in 1964. 
China‟s nuclear explosive test, following on 
the heels of her victory over India, increased 
India‟s insecurity. This insecurity among 
other factors motivated India‟s nuclear 
weapons program. 
Indian official stance is that its nuclear 
research and development programs are 
intended for peaceful purposes only. But in 
reality, Indian nuclear program has an 
aggressive purpose. US intelligence agencies 
contend that India has all the components 
necessary to make nuclear weapons, within 
hours if necessary. Moreover, India itself 
denies possessing a nuclear arsenal.(Zachary 
S.Davis:1994) India‟s capability of making a 
nuclear bomb is due to its extensive nuclear 
infrastructure. Currently, the infrastructure 
consists of 9 power reactors, 8 heavy water 
plants, 4 plutonium reprocessing plants, 2 
uranium enrichment facilities, 9 research 
reactors, and 1 fast breeder reactor 
(PervaizIqbal Cheema: 1995-96). Further, 
twelve power reactors, four heavy-water 
plants and two plutonium reprocessing plants 
are planned for future development of its 
nuclear program (PervaizIqbal Cheema: 1995-
96).  It is estimated that if its existing reactors 
operate at full capacity, they can produce 360 
kilograms of plutonium per year. In brief, 
India may produce approximately 50 nuclear 
devices within a year (Zachary S.Davis:1994).  
Due to these capabilities, India falls into a 
category between the five declared Nuclear 
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Weapon States (NWS) and nearly all other 
states, which have renounced nuclear debate. 
Thus, India should be termed as „a nuclear 
threshold state‟. Moreover, since its “peaceful 
nuclear explosion of 1974, India is considered 
as a defacto member of the nuclear club. 
India‟s attitude towards the present Nuclear 
Non Proliferation Regime (NNPR) is 
negative. It has resisted a number of non-
proliferation initiatives by other states. It 
refuses to joint Non Proliferation Treaties 
(NPT) as well as Comprehensive Test Bend 
Treaties (CTBT). It has dismissed almost all 
regional nuclear as well conventional arms 
control measures proposed by Pakistan. It 
argues that, it is willing to participate in a 
nuclear restraint regime, but only if it is non-
discriminatory and takes into account India‟s 
security concerns vis-à-vis China. (The Asian 
Socity:1994). The following part of the 
discussion will elaborate three factors. The 
identification of the perceptions and priorities 
which have formulated the Indian nuclear 
policy. Secondly, the development of Indian 
nuclear program and finally the Indian 
approach towards the NNPR. 
Factors Responsible for Indian Nuclear 
Program 
There are four major factors which compel 
India to go ahead with its nuclear program. 
They are almost the same that led the US, 
former USSR, UK, France and China to 
undertake absolutions nuclear program. They 
are: 
(a). Security Considerations 
(b). Political prestige and Influence 
(c). Economic benefits, and 
(d). Domestic Compulsions 
(a) Security Considerations 
Defense policy of a state is based on a number 
of calculations and considerations. These 
include, among other things, the geographical 
location and relations with the neighboring 
states, the power structure in the regime, real 
or imaginary threats to its territorial integrity 
and the role which political elite like state to 
play in future. India‟s geographic proximity to 
communist Beijing has also been problematic. 
India‟s defeat in the 1962 border conflict with 
China proved its military unpreparedness and 
exacerbated tensions between the two 
countries (George Perkovich: 1999).  Two 
years after the conflict, China tested a nuclear 
weapon, making Indian politicians question 
the wisdom of their nuclear policies. (Joyce 
Battle: n.d). 
In case of India, its border with Pakistan and 
China are not secure. Its relations with these 
neighbouring states are tense, especially with 
Pakistan. Recently, Sino-Indian 
rapprochement has started. Both states 
initiated moves in 1996 to reduce this tension. 
But these positive developments between 
India and China are not enough for India to 
ignore China in its defense posture. India has 
increased its defense budget by 8% for the 
year 1996-1997 (Dawn: 1996). In fact China 
and India are locked in a struggle for 
leadership within the developing world, 
especially Asia. India is a big power of South 
Asia. But Pakistan denies its big brothers role 
in South Asia. China is viewed as the 
supporting element of Pakistani defense 
infrastructure. Therefore, Indian pro-nuclear 
lobby, insist on the Indian government to 
manufacture nuclear weapons to keep India at 
par with China. They link issues such as, 
Sino- Indian war of 1962, china as a nuclear 
weapon state and china-Pakistan friendship 
since 1962 and Chinese support to Pakistan in 
indo-Pakistan war in September 1965 etc, to 
convince the world in general and the public 
in particular that the existence of India as 
sovereign state has been at stake. Ram 
Chandra Bade, Jan Sangh Parliamentarians, 
said in LokSabha on March 23, 1963, “only 
those who wish to see Russian‟s or Chinese 
ruling India will oppose the development of 
nuclear weapons. (AkhtarAli:1984).Nuclear 
hawks in India think that only nuclear 
weapons have ability to solidify India‟s 
defense. 
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Nuclear hawks have pleaded for an 
independent nuclear armory to check China‟s 
possible blackmail of India. They argue that 
the problem of high cost of production of 
nuclear weapons could be met by reducing 
expenditure on conventional forces (Ziba 
Moshaver: 1991). This school of thought has 
rejected the concept of collective security. 
They argue that super powers did not ever 
come to rescue India, rather supported those 
states, where their own existence was 
threatened. If India has to India, if she has to 
safeguard the national interests, it ought to 
materialize its nuclear weapons option. (They 
plead for sovereign deterrence). Dr Homi J 
Bhabha opined in his paper presented to the 
12th Pugwash conference in January 1964. In 
the “conventional weapons could only provide 
relative deterrence while nuclear weapons 
give absolute deterrence” (Ziba Moshaver: 
1991).Eventually, the nuclear hawks 
succeeded in convincing the Indian 
parliamentarians. The notable point here is 
that parliamentarians from different political 
parties have identical view over the use of 
nuclear technology. For example, during 1965 
war, over 100 members of the Indian 
parliamentarians belonging to the Congress, 
the PSP, the Swatantra Party alongside the 
independent members urged the government 
to develop its own nuclear deterrence. The 
statement said”… India‟s survival both as a 
nation and a democracy in the face of the 
collusion between China and Pakistan, casts a 
clear and imperative duty on the government 
to take an immediate decision to develop our 
nuclear weapons (HasanAskari Rizvi: 1975) 
Political prestige 
India considers itself as a preeminent power of 
South Asian region. It has ambitions to play a 
much wider role than just being confined to 
South Asia. Due to its great number of 
population and territorial size, it sees itself as 
the natural successor to the British colonial 
heritage in South Asia. This vision compels 
the Indian ruling elite that India must play a 
dominant role in the developing countries of 
Asia and Africa. This was reason, on account 
of which India became one of the pioneers of 
the Non-Aligned Movement. India considers 
nuclear device a tool of becoming a major 
power. The nuclear hawks quote that US did 
not recognize China till it became important 
for US once it demonstrated its nuclear 
device. Therefore, if India became a nuclear 
power, definitely it will earn more respect in 
the international system. 
 
Nuclear weapons are also viewed by the less 
developed states as symbol of modernization. 
They believe that nuclear device would make 
them able to influence some international 
events in their favour. The Indian case is 
perhaps the clearest demonstration of this 
nationalism. One finds a rallying point: “Build 
the bomb the bomb means power” (Pervez 
Hoodbhoy: 1994). 
Economic Factors 
India is a highly populated state. It is passing 
through the process of urbanization and 
industrialization. India‟s energy requirements 
need, it is argued, could be met only by 
nuclear energy for power energy generation. 
The outstanding feature of nuclear energy is 
that a pound (45gms) of uranium is equivalent 
to 1,500 tons of coal, 25, 5000gallons of fuel 
oil or 40,000,000 cubic feet natural gas (Dr 
Maqsood: 1991). Coal and hydel sources are 
India‟s most extensively utilized power 
resources but both have inherent limitations. 
The problem with the sources of hydel power 
generation is that sources of hydel power 
generation are located at places remote from 
industrial centers. Moreover, the flow of water 
in many of the rivers is dependent on the 
monsoon rains. India‟s coal resources are 
concentrated in the eastern region. 
Transportation of large quantities of coal from 
places of extraction to power stations involves 
enormous expense.   It is claimed that regions 
which are more than 1,300 km away from coal 
mines may not be served economically by 
coal source (G.Mirchandam: 1981). 
Therefore, use of nuclear technology for 
power production will be more efficient in 
these areas. 
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Agriculture is an important sector of the 
Indian economy. Nuclear radiation techniques 
have been found quite effective in overcoming 
some major problems in the agriculture sector. 
Another simple but very useful application is 
in the quality control of many industrial 
products. Radio-isotopes can be used to 
ensure uniformity in the thickness of varied 
materials such as sheets of paper, cardboard, 
plastic or metal. Moreover, radio-isotope 
traces help in studying the movement of 
underground water or sand and salt and in the 
medical field as well. 
Domestic Compulsion 
For understanding the domestic pressure in 
the nuclear field, one has to look at upon all 
sections of Indian society. Scientists are one 
of the most powerful pressure group within 
the Indian society. They advocate the 
manufacture of nuclear devices. Large number 
of LokSabha members regularly asserts that 
India should nuclearize its weapon program. 
Since 1964, the nuclear issue has become an 
integrate part of public discussion. The 
common man is in favour of nuclear weapons. 
The public nuclear debate has been extension 
of one which had begun privately much earlier 
in the inner bureaucratic circles. The inner 
debate had been initially confined largely to 
the nuclear scientists, civilian intelligence 
personnel and the Indian foreign office. Their 
strength was not very large. But their 
influence spread with the passage of time 
(Jozef Goldblat: 1985). 
 
The pro-nuclear weapon element increased 
with the change in political leadership. The 
younger generation of leaders rising in 1960s 
along with Indira Gandhi in the Congress 
Party and the younger activities in the socialist 
parties were in favour of the nuclear option 
advocating it openly (Jozef Goldblat: 1985).  
The political parties derive political objectives 
from nuclear issue. The party in power 
advocates the acquisition of nuclear weapon 
status. By this they distract public attention 
from pressing and undesirable internal 
development.  It is strongly argued that high 
visibility of technological achievements can 
divert the anticipated public wrath and buy 
sufficient time for government. 
In fact in India, since 1962 there has been 
only a fraction of public option, which was 
not carried by emotions. The majority has no 
sense to realize that Chinese explosion of 
1964 was not aimed at India. The Chinese 
explosion was to improve its position, vis-à-
vis, the US and the former USSR. It was 
directly related to the question of China‟s 
status as a world power and to claim her 
rightful place as a permanent member of the 
Security Council. The Indian ? fears that 
China would use nuclear weapon against her 
do not make any sense. China did not need 
nuclear weapons for defensive purposes vis-à-
vis, India. The conventional military force at 
her disposal has been enough to defeat India. 
(HasanAskari Rizvi: 1975). But, pro-nuclear 
lobby in India always argued that china‟s 
nuclear weapons can be used against India. 
Due to this propaganda, the common man in 
India now thinks that India‟s sovereignty is 
directly link with its nuclear weapons option 
in the past the government of India has always 
tried to sell Chinese phobia to major powers 
for some benefits. For example, in the late 
1960s when negotiations were underway for 
the NPT, India had refused to joint attempting 
to seek a “Special Case” status, in view of 
described areas from China. These sorts of 
attempts by Indian government have 
strengthened the decision for nuclear weapons 
in the minds of the common man. At present 
no political party or government can rule out 
the nuclear weapons option. If they did, the 
public would oppose their decision and caused 
a political unrest. 
Indian Nuclear Program 
In identifying the first attempts by India to 
begin a nuclear program, GuaravKampani in 
his work Nuclear Overview:  Historical 
Overview as promoted in NTI identifies these 
first attempts as “India‟s nuclear program was 
conceived in the pre-independence era by a 
small group of influential scientists who 
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grasped the significance of nuclear energy and 
persuaded political leaders from the Indian 
National Congress to invest resources in the 
nuclear sector” (Guarav Kampani: 2007). 
 
As mentioned earlier, India‟s nuclear program 
was initiated much before its independence, 
introduced by the personal efforts of Dr Homi 
J Bhabha, who managed to establish the 
“Institute for Fundamental Research” with the 
assistance of Sir Dorabji Tata Trust. Dr 
Bhabha wrote to the trust declaring that: 
“When nuclear has been successfully applied 
for power production, in say a couple of 
decades from now, India will not have to look 
abroad for its experts but will find them ready 
at hand” (George Perkovich: 1999). 
India has dual policy regarding its nuclear 
program. Though it claims that its nuclear 
program is for peaceful purposes, it has never 
ruled out its application for military use. In 
June 1946, Jawaharlal Nehru said; “I hope 
Indian scientists will use the atomic force for 
constructive purpose. But if India is 
threatened, she will inevitably try to defend 
herself by all means at her disposal”. From the 
early days of independence, Indian leaders, 
especially Jawaharlal Nehru, took a very 
public and very vocal stand against nuclear 
weapons. But Nehru, a modernist, was also 
convinced that nuclear technology had a role 
to play in national development (Itty 
Abraham: 1998) 
The development of Indian nuclear program 
can be divided into three phases. In the first 
phase, the main focus was on the 
establishment of infrastructure and the 
peaceful use of nuclear technology. The 
second phase highlights change in the nuclear 
policy of India. Third phase confirmed that 
India was able to make nuclear devices. 
First Phase-Nehru Era 
The Indian government passed the Atomic 
Energy Act in 1948. By virtue of it, Indian 
Atomic Energy Commission was set up in 
August 19, 1948, with Dr Bhabha as its 
Chairman (Norman Brown: 1972). In 1954, 
India set up a multi-disciplinary centre for 
nuclear research and development at Trombay 
which is now named after its founder as the 
Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, which has 
grown from modest beginnings to become the 
premier institution of science and technology 
in the country. The first major project of this 
Centre was the construction of APSARA, a 
pool type reactor, built with British assistance 
in 1955. This was only the first step as after 
long negotiations, Canada agreed to provide 
India with the 40MW Canada-India Reactor 
(CIR), ( M.V. Ramana:2007). “Conducting 
this transition was made easier by the 
construction of India‟s first reactor, the 1Mega 
Watt Aspara Research Reactor, the Canada-
India Reactor, U.S, or CIRUS, with Canadian 
and US collaboration which started 
functioning in 1960. Acquisition of CIRUS 
was a turning point for India's nuclear 
weapons ambitions. The reactor's design was 
ideal for producing weapons-grade 
plu¬tonium. CIRUS produced the plutonium 
used in India's first nuclear test in 1974 
(.Baker Spring and Dana Robert Dillon: 
2006). Although U.S. cooperation on the 
CIRUS project was granted on the 
understand¬ing that the reactor would be used 
only for peaceful purposes, there were no 
international safeguards available to regulate 
and verify the use of transferred technology.  
Subsequently India indigenously constructed 
two additional research reactors, which went 
into operation in 1961 and 1972 respectively 
(Mirchandni: 1981). The US and India signed 
an agreement for the infrastructure of Tarapur 
Atomic Power Station in 1963 (Ashan Ali 
Khan: 1982). The significance of the U.S. 
agreement to supply heavy water is that this 
provided an additional conduit for the 
production of plutonium and allowed India to 
bypass the uranium enrichment process that 
would have been necessary to develop nuclear 
weapons.  By allowing this transfer of heavy 
water to occur in 1955, the U.S. must 
ultimately bear some responsibility for the 
nuclear tests that subsequently occurred in 
1974. 
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In the late 1950s and 60s, India pursued what 
Nehru insisted was a “peaceful nuclear 
program,” meaning that their program was not 
developed to construct nuclear weapons, but 
instead to provide energy for the populace.  
During the 1960s, changes began to occur 
within India that sparked the development of 
nuclear weapons.  Prime Minister Nehru, 
although advocating disarmament, was 
apprehensive about China‟s nuclear weapon 
program.  Upon his death, India began to 
develop the program to counter the Chinese 
program and its subsequent testing in 1964. 
(Joyce Battle.:2008)  This also evolved as a 
result of the 1962 war with China, which 
altered the Indian view of nuclear weapons.  
“In a real sense, this war began the process 
that culminated in the Indian nuclear tests of 
1998” (John W. Garver: 2001). 
Second Phase-Post1964 Era 
The late Prime Minister Nehru maintained his 
commitment practically during his era,india 
was concerned with the peaceful uses of 
nuclear technology. But soon after Nehru‟s 
death, and just five weeks later the first 
nuclear test by China (1964) his successor Lal 
Bahadur Shastri, diluted the commitment. The 
new Prime Minister said that “I cannot say 
that the present policy (for nuclear pacifism) 
is deep rooted, that it cannot be set aside and 
that it would not be changed”.(BhabhaniSen 
Gupta:1983),. Here the irony is that even 
India, the apostle of world peace, had to keep 
the nuclear weapons option open. 
 
The powerful group of nuclear hawks 
emerged during this phase. They belonged to 
different discipline of life. Fingers such as 
K.Subrahmanyam, Raj Krishna, Sisir Gupta, 
Y.B.Chavan and VikramSharabhai supported 
India‟s nuclear weapons program. They 
successfully shaped public opinion in favour 
of developing the bomb in 1968, 79 percent of 
the Indian? supported the nuclear option in 
opinion polls (Chris Smith: 1994). 
A reprocessing plant for the separation of 
plutonium at Trombay was inaugurated in 
1965. This was the first plant of its kind which 
established outside the nuclear weapons 
states. This indigenously constructed plant 
provided India with both reactor fuel and 
explosive material (Naeem Ahamed 
Salik:n.d). When the Indian scientists started 
to work on it, they had been aware of the dual 
purposes for which plutonium could be used.  
India’s Nuclear Explosion 
The most significant feature of India‟s nuclear 
development is its “peaceful nuclear 
explosion”, which was conducted on May 18, 
1974. The explosion with a blast power of 10-
15 kilotons was carried out at a depth of 
hundred meters. Plutonium was used as the 
fissile material. The blast created a crater of 
150 meters in diameter (Naeem Ahamed 
Salik: n.d).  The explosion was the logical 
outcome of the change in nuclear policies first 
hinted by Shastri in November 1964 (Shyam 
Bhatia: 1979). The test was described by 
Indian officials as a “peaceful nuclear 
explosion” (PNE).  Prime Minister Gandhi 
went further emphasizing “that the new 
nuclear know-how and technology would 
contribute to India‟s development, even if the 
economically advanced nations would suggest 
otherwise.” (Perkovich: 1999). 
 
International reaction to the Indian PNE was 
at first mixed.  The countries belonging to the 
non-aligned movement applauded the 
competence of the scientists and technologies 
that had enabled the test to be conducted.  
France sent congratulatory messages to the 
Indian Atomic Energy Commission.  The 
United States acted swiftly, imposing 
restrictions on India that were designed to 
limit India‟s access to nuclear material and 
technology, thereby attempting to slow down 
India‟s nuclear ambitions (Virginia I. Foran: 
1999). 
The effects of this PNE were mixed in India 
as scientists desired to continue testing and the 
government, facing competing domestic 
priorities and international considerations 
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began to back away from the continuation of 
testing (Perkovich: 1999). 
India faced dramatic, complicated strategic 
problems from 1980-84.  U.S. aid to Pakistan 
in the Afghan war and Pakistan‟s advancing 
nuclear weapon program created the kind of 
external environment that would call for 
increasing the nuclear arsenal. Despite 
pressures from the nuclear establishment and 
rising military voices urging the acquisition of 
nuclear weapons, Gandhi refused to authorize 
another nuclear explosive test or other 
measures to weaponize India‟s nuclear 
capability. 
Much of the Indian debate about nuclear 
weapons between the 1960s and the 1990s did 
not consider how nuclear weapons might be 
used within the framework of Indian strategy. 
The arguments and propositions largely 
revolved around whether India should go 
nuclear, not what India should do with nuclear 
weapons (Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu: 2004). 
It was only in the 1980s that some Indian 
strategists such as K. Subrahmanyam and 
General K. Sundarji started writing about 
what nuclear weapons might be useful for. 
This view of the political utility of nuclear 
weapons is also reﬂected in arguments about 
nuclear weapons providing political space and 
strategic autonomy, arguments that former 
Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh has 
made.  Not surprisingly, the eventual Indian 
nuclear deterrent emphasized small numbers 
and a capability to retaliate, rather than 
building a deterrent force that would have 
parity with other nuclear powers. 
A significant aspect of India‟s decision to 
build the bomb was pride. “We don‟t want to 
be blackmailed [...]. Nuclear weapons will 
give us prestige, power, standing. An Indian 
will talk straight and walk straight when we 
have the bomb,” a BJP spokesman said in 
1993 (Perkovich George: 1998). Another 
motivation for developing nuclear arms was 
living next door to nuclear-armed China and 
nuclear-aspiring Pakistan. In 1996, BJP leader 
Atal Bihari Vajpayee vowed not to 
compromise India‟s national sovereignty and 
security: “We do not wish to see India blown 
apart by Pakistan or China because we did not 
possess the deterrent nuclear power.” (Krishna 
M. Bhatta and Mahesh Mehta: n.d) It was 
Vajpayee‟s party that authorized two rounds 
of nuclear tests in May 1998. 
After 24 years, India surprised the world once 
again by conducting three nuclear tests on 
Buddha Poornima Day--May 11, 1998. One 
was a plutonium type similar to the 1974 test. 
Another was a thermonuclear or hydrogen 
bomb, and the third one was a low yield 
device with a wider application--primarily a 
tactical weapon. All three devices were 
triggered by one pull. 
Two days later, on May 13, 1998, another two 
weapons were tested at Pokhran. These tests 
gave Indian scientists up-to-date knowledge 
on the latest developments in weaponisation 
of nuclear technology, including an ability to 
conduct sub-critical tests or testing by 
computer simulation in the laboratory. 
Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee later 
said: "India now is a nuclear weapon state" 
(Times of India: 1998). Brijesh Mishra, the 
Prime Minister's Special Secretary, also said 
after the May 11 tests: "These tests have 
established that India has a proven capability 
for a weaponised nuclear programme" (Times 
of India: 1998). R. Chidambaram, Chairman, 
and Atomic Energy Commission, stated: "The 
bombs tested at Pokhran were purely for 
defensive purposes." This time there was 
absolutely no reference to any peaceful nature 
of the nuclear tests. 
India's declaration of itself as a nuclear 
weapon state was seen by the Western powers 
as an effort on its part to emerge as a major 
power. The American policy makers were 
particularly sharp in advising India that there 
is no linkage between major power status and 
the possession of nuclear weapons. US 
President Clinton said that with India's 
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democratic traditions, the nuclear path is not a 
way to "greatness" (Times of India: 1998).  In 
the view of his Secretary of State, Madeleine 
Albright nuclear weapons will not help a 
country "to enhance its national strength and 
status" (Times of India: 1998). 
In 1989, William H. Webster, director of the 
CIA, testified before the Senate Governmental 
Affairs Committee that “indicators that tell us 
India is interested in thermo nuclear weapons 
capability” (William Webster: 1989). Once 
the decision to produce the bomb was made, 
India progressed quickly, especially during 
the periods when Hindu-nationalist Bharatiya 
Janata Party (BJP) was in power. By May 
1994, the country acquired the capability to 
deliver nuclear weapons using combat 
aircraft. By 1996, Indian scientists succeeded 
in developing a nuclear warhead that could be 
mounted on to the Army's Prithvi-1 ballistic 
missile. 
Robert Norris and Hans Kristensen estimate 
the Indian arsenal to consist of 70 assembled 
nuclear warheads, with only about 50 fully 
operational (Norris, Robert S.; Hans M. 
Kristensen:n.d). India has a declared nuclear 
no-first-use policy and continues to advocate 
the end to nuclear testing and global 
disarmament “based on the principles of 
universality, nondiscrimination and effective 
compliance.” The country is a member of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 
but only four of its 13 nuclear reactors are 
subject to IAEA safeguards. However, India 
has not signed the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty (CTBT) or the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT).   
Conclusion 
Indian nuclear power program, visualized by 
Dr. Bhabha in early fifties has been developed 
and successfully deployed both with 
indigenous efforts and western support, thus, 
placing the country in elite club of countries 
possessing advanced nuclear technology. The 
nuclear power has come of age with 
comprehensive capabilities in all aspects of 
nuclear power and is poised for a large 
expansion program. 
 
As the quote at the beginning of the paper 
illustrates, the nuclear deal is a central facet in 
India‟s new ambition policy. In essence the 
nexus of energy, economic growth and global 
power status are now at the heart of India‟s 
nuclear policy. The major aim of the deal will 
have been achieved: India will have been 
internationally recognized as a responsible 
nuclear weapons state, and with it receives the 
global acknowledgement it has always sought. 
India‟s nuclear policy has evolved gradually 
rather than dramatically. This is unlikely to 
change. Thus, there are little domestic 
political or international reasons to expect 
rapid changes in India‟s nuclear policy. But 
just as it is cautious in advancing its nuclear 
weapons arsenal, On the other hand, India is 
also unlikely to stage more nuclear tests or 
hugely increase its nuclear arsenal. Over the 
next decade, India should be expected to 
gradually increase the size of its arsenal and 
make it more robust and reliable, with some 
6000 kilometer plus range ballistic missiles 
and possibly one or two submarines capable 
of firing long-range ballistic missiles. 
Finally, it is crucial to note that India has 
shown restraint in its nuclear policy to 
establish good relations with the major 
countries in the nuclear non-proliferation 
regime, such as the U.S., and it recently 
finally obtained an unrestricted access to 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy from them. 
Therefore, India primarily desires to be a 
major-power with high-level and peaceful 
nuclear technology. 
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